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Abstract
Melbourne‟s unique franchise model for public transport management and service delivery,
now a decade old, is a subject of international interest for practitioners and scholars of
transport planning.
In December 2009, two new franchisees, under reworked eight-year contract arrangements,
took over the operation of Melbourne‟s train and tram systems ending the ten-year run of the
two survivors of the first decade of public transport privatisation – Connex (Veolia) and the
Transdev/Transfield consortium.
Based on material from public documents and interviews with senior managers from the
departing companies and the Victorian Department of Transport, this research uses the
perspectives of the departing franchisees, with their previous intimate engagement and
current detachment from on-going operational and institutional issues, to provide a unique
insight into the dynamics of Melbourne‟s franchise system.
The research explores the lessons of the first decade of privatisation of transit operations in
Melbourne. It examines financial performance, the value to government of the franchises as
a means to distance itself from public criticism over the operation of public transport, and the
effectiveness of planning for current and future patronage growth.
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1. Introduction
Introduced during the wave of privatisations of public utilities in Britain, Australia and New
Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s, the franchise operation of Melbourne‟s tram and train
systems is a unique experiment in the application neo-liberal ideologies to the design and
delivery of metropolitan public transport services. Its performance, over the decade since the
first contracts were signed in 1999, has been hotly debated.
Support has come from expected ideological quarters such as the IPA (Allsop 2007), who
rely in large part on data and analysis provided by Jim Betts, an architect and current chief
regulator of the franchises as Secretary of the Victorian Department of Transport (DoT). The
principal academic critic, Paul Mees, (2005, 2010) bases his analysis on benchmarking of
the performance of Melbourne‟s public transport governance regime against cities that have
achieved long-term improvements in public transport patronage and operational efficiency. In
the court of public opinion, privatisation is clearly seen as a major cause of the many current
ills of the system.
In this research, the voices of the franchisees themselves are heard through interviews with
senior managers of Connex and Yarra Trams1. Both companies had held franchises, for the
trains and trams respectively, since 1999, but each lost its bid to continue when the
government re-tendered for operation of the services in 2009.
While the perspectives of the franchisees represent only one view on a complex set of
issues, they are very valuable for their immediacy of the links to current debates and in the
frankness that their departure from the scene allows. Although interpretation of events may
vary, some confirmation of facts was achieved through an interview conducted with Hector
McKenzie, the current Director of the Public Transport Division within the DoT, and
statements made by interviewees were checked against material on the public record.
To evaluate the intentions and performance of the franchises, three broad areas are
covered: financial performance; the value to government of the franchises as a means to
divert criticism over the operation of public transport; and the effectiveness of planning for
current and future patronage growth. The conclusions reached in each of these areas
provide a useful component of a fuller assessment of the outcomes of the franchising
experiment, which, because of the many parameters involved, is beyond the scope of this
paper.

1

A joint interview with Connex managers (Jonathan Metcalfe (CEO), Mark Paterson (Director,
Corporate Affairs) and Chris White (General Manager, Network Development)) was undertaken on 8
Dec 2009. Dennis Cliche, CEO of Yarra Trams under the Transdev/Transfield franchise was
interviewed on 4 March 2010. All unattributed quotes are from these interviews.
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2. Franchising in Melbourne: intention and performance
A brief history of the operation of the tram and train franchises is set out in Table 1.
1999

-

2000

Train and tram operations privatised with two competing regions created
for each mode. Three private operators took up the four franchises on
offer: National Express (Bayside Trains (M-Train) and Swanston Trams
(M-Tram)); Transdev/Transfield (Yarra Trams); and Connex (Hillside
Trains)
ALP elected
M-Tram and M-Train report financial difficulties

2001

- Decision not to build Rowville/ Monash rail line
- Box Hill tram extension paid for by the government
- Sydenham rail extension paid for by the government

2002

-

Financial „rescue package‟ (AUD$110m) for operators
Collapse of National Express franchises (for M-Train and M-Tram);
government faces crisis in franchise system
Airport rail link concept scrapped

2003

State government rescues franchise system by creating new franchise
model based on a single operator for each mode

2004

Government negotiates with Connex and Yarra Trams and new train and
tram franchises are signed

2006

Proposal for $1b rail expansion to Dandenong line as part of government
plan Meeting Our Transport Challenges (later abandoned)

2007

2008

2009

2010

-

Existing Connex and Yarra Trams contracts extended by 12 months to
November 2009
Overcrowding on peak hour trams and trains („Early Bird‟ offers begin)
Siemens trains suffer braking problems; speed restrictions imposed

-

Announcement of possible 2 year delay on new Myki ticketing system

-

Five „Bumblebee‟ trams leased from France

-

Release of State Government‟s Victorian Transport Plan

-

-

New franchises announced (June); both existing operators are replaced
(Metro Trains Melbourne and Keolis Downer EDI, which chose to trade as
Yarra Trams); 8-year contracts signed
Buyback of retired Hitachi trains

-

Delays in delivery of new trains
Continuing brake problems with Siemens trains

Table 1: Major events in franchising of Melbourne’s trams and trains since 1999

The first moves towards the adoption of franchising as the preferred model for public
transport governance came with the election of the Kennett Government in 1992, but it took
some time for the proponents of a privatised system to develop a model that would ensure
profitability for private interests (Cole 2003). In 1995, the Treasurer, Alan Stockdale,
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established the Transport Reform Unit (TRU) within his department to refine the details of a
franchising model. The current Secretary of the Department of Transport, Jim Betts, came to
Melbourne from the UK to work in the TRU. (He has been intimately involved with all phases
of privatisation in Melbourne, writing key sections of apparently independent analyses of its
performance including the audit review of government contracts initiated by the incoming
ALP government (Russell et al. 2000), which was instrumental in locking in ALP support for
franchising during the financial crises of 2002-04.)
The preferred option of the TRU was to create four „competing‟ corporations – two for
suburban train and two for tram operations – for later sale or franchising to the private sector
through competitive bidding.
The expectations of the architects of the 1999 privatisation of Melbourne‟s trams and trains
were clear: “bringing in private operators would have (positive) effects on efficiency, service
delivery (and) customer focus” (Stockdale, quoted in Cole, p. 30).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the performance of franchises in detail, but two
parameters can be examined as proxies for Stockdale‟s stated expectations. These are
financial performance and effectiveness in planning for growth. A third area for investigation
is the way government has used the franchise arrangements as a means to „spin‟ its
relationship with the public over transport issues.

2.1. Financial performance
There has been heated debate about the financial performance of the public transport
franchises. Most of this hinged on a report by the Victorian Auditor General from 2005 and a
graph, contained in this report, showing past and projected subsidies paid to the train
franchisees. This graph is reproduced below in Figure 1, with the original explanatory notes
from the Auditor General‟s report (p. 25).
This graph was used to argue that:
the privatisation of Melbourne‟s trams and trains has been an expensive failure. By
June 2006, the privatised system will have cost $1.2 billion more in public subsidies
than continued operation by the former PTC (Mees et al. 2006).
The Department of Infrastructure2 attempted to refute this claim (DoI 2007, p. 9) by arguing
that the Auditor General had not included adjustments for inflation – a clear
misrepresentation of the original graph as the explanatory notes in Figure 1 show. It also
argued that most of the subsidy increase was spent on new rolling stock, staff and services.
However, analysis of Annual Reports shows that expenditure on these items made up only
55 percent of the total subsidy payment (Figure 2). The unaccounted sum, which amounted
to $122 million in 2005, is described by the Auditor General as payment to “secure the
franchisees‟ operation over the franchise period” (2005, p. 26). It should also be noted that
these subsidy payments did not include fare revenues which were received directly by the
operators.

2

The Victorian Department of Infrastructure became the Department of Transport in April 2008.
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Figure 1: Graph from Victorian Auditor General – subsidies paid to train franchisees

While both Connex and Yarra Trams managers generally accepted this analysis of the scale
of growth in subsidies, both argued that this was offset by their cost risk, which was imposed
through the mechanism of performance penalties (2009). Cliche points to penalties for
breaches of performance standards imposed on Yarra Trams of $25 million in 2009.
In the lead up to the 2009 re-tendering process, the heat came out of the previously intense
debate about the costs of franchising with the surprisingly frank and anti-climatic admission
by the then Minister for Public Transport Lynne Kosky that: "it's no cheaper…we have had to
put a lot more money into the system" (Lucas 2009b). And, in the new contracts, annual
performance penalties have been capped at $12 million, so removing the major element of
cost risk.
Current payments to train and tram operators are difficult to compare accurately with the
2004/05 figures reported by the Auditor-General because payments now include fare
revenues. The May 2010 state budget estimated that payments to train and tram operators
would be $1.18 billion in the 2010/11 financial year. Adjusting for inflation and removing fare
revenues (Budget Papers, ch. 3, p. 231), it can be broadly estimated that, on the same scale
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as that used by the Auditor-General in 2005, the payment to operators would be around
$700 million (or half as much again as indicated in the Auditor-General‟s forecasts).
These blowouts in subsidies clearly have not been accompanied by
improvement in services. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess
performance in detail, but it is sufficient to note that the government‟s
customer satisfaction for trams and trains is, in the 2010 budget papers,
percent.

a comparable
service quality
own target for
put at only 70

Government subsidies for trains and trams (corrected for inflation )

Figure 2: Breakdown of increased subsidy by payment purpose
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"securing the franchisees' operation"
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new rolling stock
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400

300

200
Sources: Auditor General Victoria
(2005); DoI (2007); various state agency
Annual Reports.

100

0
1998/99

2005/06

2.
Depoliticising public transport: relationships between
government, franchisees and the public
If, as seen in the previous section, franchising is costing more, why does the government
persist with it? Political science theory provides one set of reasons. Government decisions
since 1999 make sense if seen as an example of a desire to depoliticise the business of
governing. Depoliticisation describes a mode of governance that includes:
a range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can attempt
to move to an indirect relationship and/or seek to persuade the [public] that they can
no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy field or …
decision (Buller and Flinders 2005, pp. 295-296)
This does not imply that the political dimension no longer exists; rather it suggests that the
politician recognises an advantage in the appearance of distance.
There is certainly much in the current operations of Melbourne‟s public transport system that
any minister would wish to keep at arm‟s length, although it remains to be seen whether the
electorate are persuaded that fault lies with the operators.
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Certainly, the operators recognised that the government was looking for “shield” when the
ranking of public transport as an issue for voters went from a ranking of sixth at the time of
the 2006 election to first place by early 2009 (Metcalfe et al. 2009). Both Metcalfe and
Dennis Cliche, from Yarra Trams, made the unsurprising suggestion that this imperative was
likely to have played a part in the government‟s decision to choose two new franchisees in
June 2009.
Metcalfe recognised the need for the government and the franchisee to maintain their
working partnership by being scrupulous in defending each other in public. However, he felt
that Connex had “gone too far, for little return, until too late in the piece”. He also said that
most of the company‟s effort had gone into:
maintaining and developing its partnership with the government and the department,
at the expense of developing a relationship with customers.
This exposes one of the risks of the franchise model described by BITRE economist Peter
Kain, who argues that the creation of “„cosy‟ relationships between the franchisee and the
government are regulatory capture in another guise” (2006, p. 62).
Both Metcalfe and Cliche acknowledge that the private operators should play an active role
in promoting public transport in public and political debate even to the extent, as Metcalfe
said, of “making the relationship with the government difficult”. However, only Yarra Trams
made significant efforts in this regard during the first decade of franchising, particularly
through the work of its first CEO, Hubert Guyot, from 1999 to 2004. In Cliche‟s view, Guyot
was able to:
get people in [state and] local government, in Vicroads, and the public to some
extent, to … understand how important trams were to the overall fabric of Melbourne
[and to reverse their previous belief that] trams were a necessary evil or a freak of
history.
It is an interesting comment on both the franchising process and the government‟s transport
policy priorities that, despite the fanfare surrounding the big public transport projects in the
Victorian Transport Plan, no individual politician or official from the DoT has succeeded
Guyot as a credible advocate for public transport as a competitor to the car. The absence of
public figures able to carry a brief on technical issues in professional forums is illustrated by
reference to a particular incident in the on-going debate about road-space priority – a central
issue for tram management, which Guyot and Cliche had pursued in various forums.
During 2009, the death of a cyclist prompted Melbourne City Council to re-consider the reallocation of space in Swanston St, the CBD‟s main spine. Because the timing of
consultations coincided with the transfer of the tram franchise from Transdev to Keolis,
Cliche was no longer on the scene. He had previously made very strong representations to
the Lord Mayor, Robert Doyle, against the latter‟s election promise in 2008 to re-open
Swanston St to cars. However, with Keolis just finding its feet, there were no institutional
voices actively engaged in the debate on behalf of tram passengers and tram operational
requirements, and the outcomes of the process reflect this. The absence of the operator only
served to emphasise the silence of the Transport Minister and the DoT.
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The very thin public offerings from the government and the DoT in relation to the practical
operations of the $4 billion „Regional Rail Link‟ to bring Geelong trains to Southern Cross via
Sunshine and Footscray provide another case in point, although there is not space in this
paper to explore this in detail.

2.2. Planning for growth
Beyond finances and political positioning, the key question for the franchise model is this.
How well does it work to plan and deliver public transport services that are needed to meet
the current demand and, more crucially, to meet the challenges of peak oil, climate change,
suburban social isolation and population growth?
Planning for public transport is required at three levels, originally defined by van de Velde
(1999) as:






Strategic – system objectives such as levels of accessibility, mode-share targets, and
cost-recovery levels.
Tactical – translation of strategic objectives into system-wide service plans, such as
design of networks choice of technologies and co-ordinating timetables.
Operational – translation of tactical planning into day-to-day operations such as
workforce management and maintenance.

Supporters of the franchise model, including the current Secretary of the DoT, argue that
successful planning can be done under the franchise system through careful allocation of
strategic, tactical and operational planning functions between the parties (Stanley et al.
2006). Some critics, using evidence from cities that have achieved significant long-term
growth in public transport patronage, argue that a regional public authority with staff skilled in
the application of modern techniques network planning is necessary to ensure the tactical
delivery of clear strategic objectives set by government through effective processes of
community engagement (Mees 2010; Nielsen 2005). Recent research, to be reported at this
conference, has shown some support for this model from Melbourne‟s private operators
themselves (Lazanas and Stone 2010).
Three issues are used to explore the planning and delivery of public transport services in
Melbourne under the franchise model: the huge patronage targets contained in the first
franchise contracts in 1999, the responses to the real growth in patronage on the trains since
2005, and the efforts to give priority to trams on congested roads.

2.3.1. Huge patronage growth targets in 1999 contracts
In all four franchises signed in 1999, the bidders proposed large reductions in government
subsidies over the life of the contracts (see Figure 1). These attractive propositions were
based on the promise of large increases in patronage – up to 83 percent over fifteen years in
the case of the National Express bid for Bayside Trains. Although, it has since become clear
that the bidders intended to meet the subsidy shortfalls by cost cutting rather than by
patronage growth.
In hindsight, it is difficult to believe that anyone took seriously these projections for
simultaneous cost reduction and patronage growth with no explicit program for service
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improvements, and it is now unsurprising that the contracts based on such goals quickly
unravelled. One can only assume that the TRU did little to validate the bidders‟ forecasts
because they were blinded by ideology.
Connex now says that it over-estimated the options for reform: “Alan Brown [Liberal
Transport Minister from 1992-96] had done more than we realised” in cutting staff and
removing inefficiencies within the government-run Public Transport Corporation (research
interview). For its part, National Express was relying on a large-scale Thatcherite assault on
wages and conditions that was stymied by the unexpected election of the ALP in late 1999
and the strength of union resistance (Stone 2009b). In addition, the tactic of the operators
was to promise high and sort it out later. As Cliche put it, “if you don‟t bid aggressively, you
are not there to try and fix it”.
There was another factor behind the ability of bidders to propose such large targets without
having to set out any clear mechanisms for fulfilling their promises. That factor is the
„disconnect‟ between stated government policies on public transport and the expectations of
powerful figures within successive administrations of both parties – a characteristic feature of
Melbourne transport policymaking since Steve Crabb‟s undermining of the ALP‟s „no
freeway‟ policy in 1982 (Stone 2009a).
The ALP may have set a target of „20% of all motorised trips by public transport by 2020‟ in
the Melbourne 2030 strategic plan (DOI 2002), but this was quickly recast by the caroriented senior management of the DoI as an „aspirational‟ goal and largely ignored in the
development of plans for further freeway construction. Moreover, whether they believed the
target was possible or not, public transport managers were in a very weak position in the
wider state bureaucracy. An illustration of just how weak is the fact that budget bids for
extensions of the Epping rail line to South Morang (an ALP election promise) were included
in forward estimates in the 2003 and then subsequently removed.
It might be said, in light of the patronage growth spurt that began in 2005, that the original
bid forecasts were simply premature. However, the state has twice had to bear the cost of
false assumptions about future patronage. First, as we have seen, because it chose to bail
out the private operators in 2004 and, second, because the 2005 patronage spurt came as a
surprise to operators and departmental planners.

2.3.2. Responding to patronage growth after 2005
Patronage growth on both train and tram was first observed in 2005 and has continued. It is
welcome, although figures from BITRE (2009) show that Melbourne is not, as the DoT has
claimed, “Australia‟s public transport capital” (DoT 2009, p. 11). The response of the
government and Connex to this growth illustrates the exercise of the „tactical‟ planning
function under Melbourne‟s franchise system.
Despite the patronage targets in the original franchise agreements, “the reality is that no-one
was planning for growth” (Metcalfe) until well after this „spurt‟ began. Government analysts
(Gaymer and Kinnear 2009) accept that most new passengers were coming to the public
transport for reasons external to the management of the system itself. These reasons
include demographic changes such as growth in CBD employment and inner-city
gentrification, rising petrol prices and growing environmental awareness.
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The first response of planners in Connex and the DoI was to assume that the growing
patronage was “a blip”. During 2005 and 2006 a range of explanations were postulated,
including petrol price rises and a „boost‟ from the Commonwealth Games in March 2006. A
common feature of these explanations was an assumption that growth would quite soon
return the pattern of annual growth that had been seen consistently since about 1980. This
growth of around 1.0-1.5 percent p.a. was roughly in line with population growth.
Because the 2004 franchises were written on the assumption that this pattern of slow
patronage growth would continue, there was no formal mechanism in the contracts to deal
with the reality that the operators faced after 2006. As it became obvious that the rate of
patronage growth was not abating, there was no clear direction for either party.
The department‟s first response was to cobble together a package of capital works and
service upgrades in Meeting Our Transport Challenges (DOI 2006). The „big ticket‟ items in
this plan included a third track from Dandenong to Caulfield (since abandoned), the
development of the SmartBus suburban orbital routes, and the procurement of additional
rolling stock. It also marked the first assertions of an apparent „capacity crisis‟ in the
operation of the inner city rail network. This theme was expanded upon in Sir Rod
Eddington‟s East West Links Needs Assessment (2008) and critiqued by Mees (2008) and
Dotson (2009).
Connex was not part of the development of this plan, which Metcalfe later described as “a
grab bag of projects”. Its focus on infrastructure investment, rather than on the sorts of
operational planning suggested by Mees and Dotson, can partly be explained by the
absence of the operational perspective inside the DoT.
There was, however, recognition of the need to involve the operator in future planning. In
2006, a „retreat‟ attended by senior DoT and Connex officials resulted in what was called the
„Lancefield Accord‟. This agreement set the groundwork for a new operating plan, which,
with the attendant process of „network development partnerships‟, was written in to the new
franchises. This new operating plan will deliver some simplified stopping patterns, run some
citybound trains on the previously unused tracks that bypass the City Loop, and rely more on
transfers for passengers to reach their destinations. This will allow the creation of new
timetables that, if done effectively, will go some way towards maximising the impact of the 38
new trains funded through MOTC and the later Victorian Transport Plan.
This joint planning still only addressed short and medium term objectives. Connex had no
engagement with the DoT in planning for the Regional Rail Link (from Werribee to the CBD
via Sunshine) or the Metro Tunnel proposals.
Connex managers suggest that too many planners, in its own ranks and in the DoT, are
without experience beyond Melbourne. This observation is directly at odds with the
government‟s claim that “innovation and international expertise” (Lucas 2009b) are the major
benefits of the franchise model.
The response to the unexpected patronage growth reveals significant problems with public
transport planning in Melbourne. As a direct consequence of the franchise arrangements,
operational and capital planning functions have been separated leading to poor outcomes
such as MOTC, with its unhelpful reliance on capital works at the expense of operational
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changes. This reliance on capital solutions explains, to some extent, the creation by the DoT
of the so-called „capacity crisis‟ to justify its budget bids. Its defensiveness in response to
criticisms by Mees and Dotson reinforces perceptions of a lack of skills within the
Department and puts it in an invidious position of having to explain how it is that new
capacity has now been found. This defensiveness extends to employing consultants to
debunk their critics (Lucas 2010), and is direct contrast to the efforts of the successful public
transport manager, Stuart Hicks in Perth, who made a point of finding ways to “deal with the
objections (of his critics) constructively and so build a stronger consensus” (Stone 2009a, p.
430).

2.3.3. Getting priority for trams on congested roads
The major planning issue for the tram operations in Melbourne is to improve tram speeds
and reliability by reducing conflicts between trams and private cars. This is one objective of
the Vicroads‟ SmartRoads Network Operating Plans (announced in Feb 2010) with the
intention of defining “which transport modes have priority on the road at different times of the
day” (Vicroads 2010).
Many inner-suburban arterial roads in Melbourne are also busy shopping and commercial
strips. This creates a conflict for road space between traffic flow and parking. Peak period
parking bans – called „clearways‟ – are the principal tool used to manage this conflict.
SmartRoads included a plan to extend the hours of „clearway‟ operation after 9 am and
before 4 pm in many of these shopping precincts, sparking a fierce backlash from traders
and local councils. Cliche says that SmartRoads was:
clearly a car-driven strategy … but if we could take it and get something for trams it
would be well worth it …Today, we have, at least, a symbolic statement that this is
how Vicroads – with the sanction of government – will allocate road space in the
future… To say „this is a priority route for public transport‟ would have been
impossible five years ago.
Although noting that it is still only symbolic, Cliche sees this as one of the few policy gains
for trams in recent years. He found it very difficult to get serious attention paid to the needs
for investment in the tram system because:
The DoT mantra for years was „get the trains out of trouble and keep the trams off
the front page‟ ... all our projects got pushed out … even in the last budget I was
there (only) $5 million for tram (compared with) $880 million for (metro and country)
trains … Kosky was very unsuccessful in getting us money.
With only limited funds for discretionary projects such as improving signal priority, Cliche
found a further bottleneck in a lack of resources for this function within Vicroads:
with very little money (allocated to trams to start with), much of it was going to
Vicroads to support the replacement of traffic signalling.
Cliche fears that will be some time before the new franchisee will have the credibility and the
local experience to be able to act effectively to reverse this situation. Particularly, he argues,
because Keolis came to Melbourne with the intention of winning the train franchise:
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the people they recruited for the bid were train people – their safety person came
from Railcorp NSW, their COO ran a train station for SNCF.
As Cliche understands the process, his company was the only respondent to the original
expression of interest for the tram tender, and Keolis entered the field only after the
government offered $5 million to potential bidders. Under the rules for the re-tendering, a
consortium could bid for both the tram and train franchises, but would not be able to win
both. Cliche believes that there was a tacit understanding that, by providing competition for
the tram tender, Keolis would enhance its bid for the trains. While Cliche argues that his
competitor‟s bid lacked detail and depth when compared to that of his own company, Keolis
was seriously in the running for the train franchise, and was even rumoured to have won its
bid (Lucas 2009a). However, in the end, it appears that a political imperative to „clear the
decks‟ and an aggressive bid on price for trams may have left Keolis with a prize it had not
intended to win. Cliche says that, for at least two weeks after the successful bidders were
announced, the Keolis website read: „we are here to fix Melbourne‟s trains‟.

3.

Conclusion

The Melbourne experiment in public transport franchising has been assessed against three
important parameters: its financial performance, its role as tool for distancing government for
responsibility for operational performance, and its impact on the effectiveness of planning for
future improvements in service and in patronage.
On the financial measure, the government and the operators appear to broadly accept that
public subsidies for public transport operations are have grown faster than any
corresponding output in service quantity or quality.
As a tool for managing political risk, a number of decisions, including those relating to the
most recent re-tendering, appear to a considerable extent to have been made in order to
manage short-term political concerns. The ultimate success of this tactic will be tested at the
November state election.
The interviews with the departing franchisees reveal how planning for growth of public
transport in Melbourne is hampered by the rigidity of contract definitions and by the
fragmentation of responsibilities between franchisees and the government. However, even
though these are significant problems, and probably represent fatal flaws in the franchise
model, they are a less significant than the lack of real political support for public transport
solutions to Melbourne‟s transport problems. Without genuine engagement from political
leaders, departmental managers will be able to continue their defensive attitude to ideas and
criticisms from policy analysts and from the wider community, and poorly developed
programs and policies will continue to be brought forward.
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